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European Constitutionalism and Its
Discontents
J.H.H. Weiler*
Joel P. Trachtman**

PREFACE

Traditionally, the European Community has been set apart from
all other international organizations, as well as from states, and European Community law has been distinguished from both international
law and from domestic law. This was so because of the supposed
unique internal structure and processes of the European Community.
This "splendid isolation" is no longer viable. Increasingly in the .behavior - and study - of other transnational organizations, polities or

regimes, the European transnational experience has come to provide
a model, a yardstick and a set of analytical and critical tools, and perhaps erroneously, a desideratum. While European Community law is
no nirvana, it has contributed to our world-view both as a substantive
demonstration of one developmental path and as the instrument of
reformation of our perceptions of international law. It is time to recognize that European Community law is not a different species of law,
but is a mutation of the same species.
* Manley Hudson Professor of Law and Jean Monnet Chair, Harvard Law School; Co-Director, Academy of European Law, European University Institute, Florence, Italy. This essay is
based on Prof. Weiler's keynote address to the conference on Institutions for International Economic Integration under the auspices of the International Economic Law Group of the American Society of International Law. In order to maintain the informal nature of the original
address, this essay has been written with a minimum of footnotes, but provides a brief bibliography of selected relevant materials.
** Associate Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
While this essay is largely the work of Prof. Weiler, he graciously invited Prof. Trachtman to
participate as co-author in order to recognize the major contribution of Prof. Trachtman to the
final version of the essay.
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The alleged uniqueness of the European experience is often captured by the words/concepts of constitutionalization and constitutionalism - which for a very long time have provided the vocabulary for
describing and thinking about the European construct. Increasingly,
one finds this vocabulary of constitutionalism employed in discourse
of other international organizations, notably the GATT and WTO.
Sometimes the vocabulary is explicit - like the pioneering work of
Petersmann both describing and prescribing the WTO in constitutional terms. Sometimes other words - legalization, juridification and
the like - are used to describe the same phenomenon. Sometimes one
finds constitutional borrowing in proposals for institutional and doctrinal reform: Article 177 of the EC Treaty - the procedural cornerstone of European constitutionalism - has been famously advocated
for the GATT and for the European Court of Human Rights and a
broader use of direct effect - such as that which prevails in Europe - is
a regular feature in the examination of free trade areas.
The dangers of "borrowing" from one legal system to another are
famous: the law of any polity is a construct embedded in a specific
social and political culture and its transmutation to other polities is
not easily achieved. Similarly, it is dangerous to assume that intellectual conceptualizations travel with any less difficulty. Law, like any
other human institution, always has a history. This too has proven to
be a trap for comparative analysis. First, there is a tendency to make
our comparison at a given point in time, thereby overlooking some of
the dynamic effects of the phenomena compared. Second, it is often
hard to synchronize the different time scales of the comparison.
Third, law is a complex social phenomenon that confounds simple
metrics of comparison and prescription. Finally, the intellectual prisms through which law is observed and conceptualized are also often
quite different in disparate systems. The very word "theory" means
different things in, say, continental legal dogmatics and American law.
Yet, it is irresponsible and defeatist to think that no cross-fertilization
among legal systems is possible. The European Union should no
longer be viewed as either sui generis or nirvana, but its distinct history should not be disrespected.
Seeing the extent to which the European "constitutional" experience is being used in other contexts, this essay tries to make a contribution by addressing some of the specificities of that experience. This
essay will address the intellectual history of constitutionalization and
constitutionalism in European integration as well as some of the recent challenges to the concept and its practices. By doing so, it is
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hoped to contribute to the evolving methodology of comparative
transnational constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism came into being as a result of a process and
went through "different versions." Alec Stone, a political scientist, offers as good a characterization of the constitutionalization process as
any:
[T]he process by which the EC treaties evolved from a set of legal ar-

rangements binding upon sovereign states, into a vertically integrated
legal regime conferring judicially enforceable rights and obligations on
all legal persons and entities, public and private, within [the sphere of

application of EC law].
A slightly different characterization capturing much of the legal
literature as well as the rhetoric of the European Court itself would
focus on the alleged shift from a legal order founded by international
treaties negotiated by the governments of states under international
law and giving birth to an international organization, to a Community
which has evolved and behaves as if its founding instrument were not
a treaty governed by international law but, to use the language of the
European Court of Justice, a constitutional charter governed by a
form of constitutional law.
The importance of this characterization, in our view, is that it not
only catches what the legal literature has considered most important
in the structural evolution of the European Community but also the
fascination, not to say enamored fascination - and pragmatic interest
(measured in the currency of money, power and status) which Constitutionalization has held to the community of Community lawyers.
Symbolically, in a very basic sense constitutionalism appears to resolve the perennial existential insecurity of international lawyers once
and for all: In constitutionalization Community law was to be recognized as "real" law - in the eyes of courts, the legal community, governments and parliaments and, most difficult to satisfy, even hardnosed international relations scholars.
One problem with this classic understanding is its finitude. Constitutionalization seeks a particular goal and is completed at a particular moment: history ends. Take, for example, the purported distance
between constitutionalized Community law and its birth parent - international law. Is that distance truly so large? Was it ever so large?
Has it remained so large? And so critical?
Another problem is that constitutionalism comes with a normative ballast, which, in the euphoric fascination and minute attention
paid to its legal "what's" and its social science "how's" and "why's"
has often been neglected. When an international treaty begins to
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boast an integrated legal system conferring rights and creating duties
on all public and private persons altogether new questions of legitimacy come to the fore which cannot be resolved by reference to the
ordinary legitimating mechanisms of international law. Harmony
turns to dissonance. The European Community today may be a
model and icon for concretizing international obligations through the
grafting of constitutionalism. It is also a cautionary tale about the normative side-effects associated with that operation.
These two themes will accompany much of our exploration of the
concept of European constitutionalism in this essay.
EUROPEAN CONSTLTUTIONALISM - REALITY AND PERCEPTION

Constitutionalism, more than anything else, is what differentiates
the Community from other transnational systems and, within the
Union, from the other "pillars."
The impact of constitutionalism is inevitable and profound. In
computer terms, it is like the operating system conditioning the process of governance itself and within which all Community programs economic, social, political - function and malfunction. These Community programs have, of course, their specific content, but they are
"written in" and "written for" a constitutional setting (and would not
necessarily "boot up" in another operating system). Even the most
superficial comparison between, say, a Council of Europe and European Community policy with similar objectives and even similar material content, will illustrate the differences. The former will look very
much like a traditional international treaty, but the latter will often be
indistinguishable from national legislation in the same field in any federal state.
Constitutionalism in the European Community is the operating
system, but we shall argue that it is the Windows operating system and
not DOS. That is, DOS was the original personal computer operating
system and Windows was constructed to overlay DOS. Similarly, public international law is the original operating system of the European
Community and of other international relations, and European Community constitutionalism was constructed to overlay - to use and to
supplement - the fundamental public international law operating
system.
Because constitutionalism captures, more than anything else,
what is special about the process of European integration, it becomes
the focal point of both the contentment and contempt of those involved in the process.
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Consider carefully the position of, say, the Commission, champion of integration, in the ongoing saga of treaty revision from the
Single European Act, through Maastricht to the 1996/97 intergovernmental conference. The holiest sanctuary of all has been the preservation of the acquis communautaire, and within the acquis, the holy of
holies is the constitutional framework of the Community. A measure
of tie Commission's past success, or, perhaps, a remarkable measure
of the hold of European integration itself, is that the constitutional
operating system became axiomatic, beyond discussion, above the debate, like the rules of democratic discourse, or even the very rules of
rationality themselves, which (until challenged by post-modern normative and epistemological precepts) seemed to condition debate but
not to be part of it.
The controversies about weighted majorities, blocking minorities
and other sensitive issues of voting power within the Council illustrate
well this point. The debate is as fierce and consequential as it is only
because it takes place within a constitutional framework in which the
outcome of votes matters. The British government, champion of
state's rights in the Community process, had to toil so valiantly, so few
against so many with tears and sweat aplenty, to preserve the voting
prerogatives of the large member states because it tacitly accepts, or
puts up with, the legal consequences of constitutionalism.
In the countless narratives of European constitutionalization, one
of the high moments, possibly the single most important one in the
process that transformed the EC treaties from a set of legal arrangements binding only upon sovereign states, was the rendering of individuals too, no longer only states, "subjects of the law" - so at least
argue the legal purists. Whether individuals were rendered true subjects of the law is something to which we shall turn later. The international relations realist masquerading as a legal realist, however, would
argue that the true achievement of constitutionalism, and the reason
Britain felt it so necessary to defend its beaches against ever-increasing majoritarian decision-making, was not in the rendering of the individual a subject of the law but in rendering states and governments
"subjects of the law" (in part by providing rights to individuals against
states). For whatever their formal status, in relation to "normal" (unconstitutionalized ) treaties, states often give the impression, under
traditional "unconstitutionalized" treaties, of being able to act as
above the law.
The operating system often hums silently in the background and
it is not necessary for its users fully to perceive or articulate its impact.
358
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Sir James Goldsmith, to give a somewhat comic example, focused his
campaign on the alleged evils of the Maastricht Treaty and its potential sequel. But if you scrutinize his manifesto with care you will see
that, like many avowed Euroskeptics, it is the constitutional framework, already in place long before Maastricht, that is at the source of
his rage.
We academics are often no less comic than the Sir James' of this
world. Sometimes we would like to think, and write as if, there is "out
there" a constitutional landscape offering itself to various interpretations. Yet, constitutionalism is, too (some would say is only), but a
prism through which one can observe a landscape in a certain way, an
academic artifact with which one can organize the milestones and
landmarks within the landscape (indeed, determine what is a
landmark or milestone), an intellectual construct by which one can
assign meaning to, or even constitute, that which is observed.
Here, too, constitutionalism often hums silently in the background. There is increasingly a welcome, substantial and growing
literature on the various policies of the Community, be it environmental policy, consumer protection, transport or social policy, which focuses on objectives, content, impact but, as with the comparable
literature within a national context, takes the constitutional operating
system for granted. Even studies specifically dealing with the European system of governance will frequently not bother, or not bother
any longer, with the constitutional premise. For example, constitutionalism is often not part of that rusty but trusty old discussion of the
Community democracy deficit (and how to solve it...) but is inevitably premised on its presence. Absent constitutionalism, the same set
of issues would emerge as the even rustier discussion of member state
democratic control of foreign policy. Likewise, New Institutionalism,
rightly, does not expend too much energy on the constitutional setting
of the Community. But try to consider its illuminating insights outside
that setting. They just do not make sense.
Trite then as it is to recall, the discourse and history of constitutionalism are not only a political - legal discourse and history in which
the players are actors such as governments and courts and the script is
made of cases, and treaties, and resolutions and debates and social,
political and legal praxis. They are, too, an intellectual history and
discourse of conceptualization and imagination.
The political-legal history, the accounts of how "... the EC treaties evolved from a set of legal arrangements binding upon sovereign
states, into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring judicially en-
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forceable rights and obligations on all legal persons and entities, public and private, within EC territory" are very well known and do not
need repeating. Though constitutionalization narratives vary, and despite very different interpretative optics employed, most accounts
share very similar images of the key political and legal milestones and
landmarks which make up the constitutional landscape. There is no
need, then, to map that landscape again.
But it is our intention to discuss briefly, to map if you wish, the
intellectual history of European constitutionalism and constitutionalization. Map, note, not chronicle. Whereas, as mentioned, accounts
of the "out there" view of constitutionalism and constitutionalization
exist aplenty, we are unaware of any systematic "discussion of the discussion" of constitutionalism and constitutionalization.
Such a discussion, even if brief, is of importance: more than any
other concept of European integration, constitutionalism has been
the meeting ground of the various disciplines which engage, conceptualize and theorize about European integration, principally political
science, international relations, political economy, law and, more recently, sociology. To understand the intellectual history of constitutionalism is to understand integration studies as a cross-disciplinary
endeavor.
There is another reason for trying to map this intellectual history.
For the thesis of this essay is that European constitutionalism is undergoing a reformation, the nature of which we shall be exploring. If
there is any merit, other than trendiness, to the use of DOS and Windows as metaphor for European constitutionalism, then a reformation
would have the same kind of underlying and far reaching - yet often
invisible - consequences as the change in a computer operating system. While the focus of our view of the reformation is the European
Community, the same phenomenon has reformed international law,
and the international law perspective on the European Community.
Thus, while constitutionalism has made much of the separation of European Community law from public international law, this reformation argues for the convergence of European Community law and
public international law. As such, it is a reformation of both European Community law and public international law. Perhaps it would
try the reader's patience to refer to Windows 95, a unitary operating
system that modifies and combines the functions of both DOS and
Windows?
What is meant by reformation will emerge in time, but inevitably
the elements of that reformation are both new data "out there" in the
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shape of, say, new positions adopted by key political actors and even
public opinion but also by a new kind of intellectual observation and
conceptualization. The reformation has to be located in both histories
of European constitutionalism.
THE

GEOLOGY OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM

1.

In the beginning there was Doctrine

In the beginning there was doctrine: the disparate legal doctrines
of the Court grappling to interpret the Treaties, to solve concrete legal
conundrums before it. Schuman said:
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single, general
plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which first create a
de facto solidarity.'
Delightfully, this prediction - or prescription - certainly is borne out
by the first stages of constitutionalization. The first steps were just
that - concrete steps. Momentous? Sure. But hardly part of a general

plan and certainly not all at once. There is even truth to the de facto
solidarity part of the Schuman Declaration, also consistent with constitutionalization. The success of constitutionalization would depend

not only, or even primarily, on the utterances of the European Court
but on constitutionalism: on their acceptance by national actors,

mainly courts, and principally national constitutional courts. That solidarity of national legal actors was developed through concrete
achievements, as the neo-neo functionalists were to argue convinc-

ingly, and has remained to this day in many cases more de facto than

de jure.
For its part, the first intellectual stratum was the more traditional
analysis of the judicial developments qua "doctrine:" Working out
their contours, examining their reach, trying to understand their rationale and their legal significance. Some might dismiss this kind of
work as intellectually empty, without systemic significance, et cetera.
And yet, this doctrinal work is the foundation for all that came after.
Clever archeologists may, through flights of creative imagination, construct rich interpretative narratives from fragments of pottery, debris
of buildings, remnants of documents. But someone must have dug the
fragments up, exposed the debris, salvaged the remnants. The original
doctrinal work is truly foundational in this sense. It has another enviable trait: more than any other aspect of the academic discussion of
1 Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950, reprinted in 13 BULL Etu. CoMMUwtrrs No. 5, at
14-15 (1980).
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constitutionalism, it has a vital and constant link to the "out there;" it
is a project which retains its professional rationale and relevance. In
this respect, doctrine is not a foundational stratum at all - it is more
like a gold seam that runs from deep down to the very surface and still
yields its riches.
2. The House That Eric Built
"Tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg and
blessed, until recently, with benign neglect by the powers that be and
the mass media, the Court of Justice of the European Communities
has fashioned a constitutional framework for a federal-type structure
in Europe."2 This is the famous opening line of Eric Stein's 1981 article in the American Journalof InternationalLaw. It is a prime example of the second stratum in academic constitutional discourse about
Europe. What this type of remarkable work did (and it, and some
others like it, did a lot more besides) was to take disparate legal doctrines, to baptize them as "constitutional" and put them together with
the bold assertion that the whole was greater than the parts - that a
constitutional framework had come into being long before the Court
was willing to use that vocabulary or, arguably, even think in those
terms. Constitutionalization was transformed into constitutionalism.
The intellectual feat here was not simply one of conceptualization. There was already in that early work an interesting working out
of relationships which involved legal and other actors: Today, with
hindsight, we can quibble or even quarrel with the early description
and analysis. We have, say, come to appreciate, through the work of a
new generation of scholars revisiting this story, that, for example, the
fashioning of the constitutional framework was the result of a far
broader interaction than Stein emphasized. Not only, as he perceptively explained, between Commission, governments, advocates general and the Court, but national courts and other statal actors too. We
would have written the opening sentence as something like - "The
European Court with its national brethren, with ...[add in your favorite actors]" - but all the new and transformative renovations take
place in the House that Eric and his colfeagues, to whom we are all
indebted, built.

2 Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1981).
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3. Eureka! Social Science Discovers Constitutionalism (and
Constitutional Lawyers Discover Social Science...)
The Archimedes of this part of the story, arguably the single most
influential group of contributors to general European integration theory, remain Haas, Schmitter, Lindberg and Scheingold with their neofunctionalist theory. Even with profound skepticism toward the view
of humanity which underlies neo-functionalism and which provides it
with its explanatory power, one may readily acknowledge the impressive intellectual construct created by its architects. Interestingly, the
original neo-functionalist work both understood and integrated what
we have called constitutionalism even if using a different vocabulary.
But, like Greek and Roman classicism, this integration was somehow
forgotten, and needed a renaissance to bring it back. The mutual
"rediscovery" of social science and constitutionalism is this renaissance and it adds several strata to the geology of constitutionalism.
Social science discovered constitutionalism in more than one way.
We will speak about international relations, political science and
sociology.
International relations has had a fickle relationship with European integration, for many years not quite being able to decide
whether the Community constituted a consort of sufficient importance
to be worthy of its attentions. The Single European Act and the 1992
program face lift had, at least, one positive result: enticing international relations back. Just as lawyers have an inbuilt bias toward constitutionalism, so international relations has an inbuilt bias against it.
Constitutionalism, after all, is in some ways the antithesis of internationalism, and constitutionalism as a motive for compliance with a
constitution contradicts much of short-term interest-based international relations theory. The advent of constitutionalism is to international relations experts in the field what perestroika was to
sovietologists. For the practitioners of international relations as conventionally conceived, the continued centrality of the national and the
state is ontologically necessary. Like all of us, they have come to love
the object of their study and would hate to see its demise. The only
reason to wish the full triumph (God forbid) of constitutionalism over
the national and the state - a final phase of constitutionalization would be to witness the comic effects of their disappearance on the
EC as an object of study for international relations. The revival of
international relations' interest in European integration has been,
thus, accompanied by a deep ambivalence toward constitutionalism.
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Today (unlike, say, ten years ago) it has become uncommon to
find international relations studies of Europe which do not perceive
constitutionalism as an important, unique, feature of the system. The
ambivalence manifests itself, however, in three principal ways. Some
studies acknowledge the importance of constitutionalism (or of the
phenomena which have been conceptualized by others as constitutionalism) in their descriptive matrix of the Community but then it disappears in their analytical apparatus. It apparently requires no
explanation. It is just there, as a datum. Other studies take battle,
overt or covert: the intergovernmental paradigm of European integration - the paradigm which most plays down supranationalism vis.
constitutionalism - has seen its most brilliant articulation in the immediate post-SEA period, arguably the crest of Constitutionalism. But,
then, aren't our finest hours frequently when under siege? We all
look for the lost key, not where it is, but under our own lamp post.
Moravcsik's intergovernmental lamp post has, admirably, been a veritable searchlight. This approach is not without its power. By employing the concepts of delegation, principal/agent relations and
problematizing informational and institutional constraints, Moravcsik
convincingly accounts for some of the reasons for the Court's success
relative to other supranational institutions, notably the Commission.
At this broad level, such theories are convincing, yet such approaches,
even with "two-level" extensions, remain, in political science terms,
underspecified, and from a legal perspective, fall short of a true appreciation of the subtle, multilevel dynamics of representation and discourse that have powered the European Community legal system
forward. Finally, there are those, taking the wise counsel of
Machiavelli, who have sought to hegemonize. If you cannot squash
them, hug them, the astute Florentine instructed. So, the elements of
constitutionalism are incorporated into the description - courts, law
and all. But the explanation is the familiar orthodoxy of international
relations: interest, consent or compulsion. States accept it because it
is in their interest, qua states.
Political science has taken two interesting tacks toward constitutionalism. One has been to observe its constitutive systemic role and
seek, within this new framework, to explore the classic concerns of
political science which' developed in statal contexts. There is nothing
deja vu in the work of the likes of Majone, Sbragia, Schmitter and
Fligstein, and of political economists like Pelkmans, Jacquemin and
Adams. For classical as the concerns of the regulatory state, of federalism and the aggregation of power, of the distributive choices in mod-

364
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ern society may be, they receive in the work represented by these
well-known scholars and others like them a new sheen since they are
explored in the context of a polity, the uniqueness and peculiarity of
which are not only stipulated but are often the raison d'etre of the
inquiry. In this strand, constitutionalism is not the object of inquiry
but its condition.
A second and more direct engagement of political science with
constitutionalism has been its positioning as an object in and of itself
worthy of analysis - and certainly not left to lawyers alone to either
describe or articulate. In this case it was not constitutionalism as a
factor or parameter in the operation of the system that needed explanation. The European Court, its doctrines and its interactions with
other actors - Community institutions, national courts, the bar, etc. became a central concern to political science with extraordinarily rewarding results. Of course it was possible to bring to this inquiry the
conceptual and methodological insights developed in court studies in
national contexts. The work of, say, Martin Shapiro, became an inspiring model: a basis from which to rethink just about all major components of the elements of constitutionalism and, in particular, to try
to give explanation to judicial activity which was not rooted in hermeneutics or doctrine. The causal questions that were asked as to the
success and failure of the spread of constitutionalism, the methodology employed in trying to respond to these questions and the implications from them broadened and deepened the discourse of
constitutionalism beyond recognition, at times forcing a rethinking of
certain doctrinal positions, so that even the most doctrinal of lawyers
would have to take note. It is Burley and Mattli who revitalized the
debate by offering the first theoretically coherent neo-functionalist account of the development of the Court, one that has spawned much
research and withstood considerable criticism. On a parallel track,
Dehousse has explored similar issues. The work of Alter and Wincott
are superb examples too. And Stone has now developed his own impressive Neo-Realist theory. These intellectual phenomena were not
a simple grafting onto Community constitutionalism of disciplinary
and methodological insights culled from other national contexts. One
of the achievements of this work and these scholars has been in reshaping the way we think about the phenomenon of constitutionalism
and its elements given its transnational experience. It is most evident
to see the migration of the insights gained here to, say, the WTO and
even the United Nations.
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But it was not only political science which discovered constitutionalism as an important parameter in the system or as an object of
inquiry in itself. Law also discovered social science. Hjalte Rasmussen's widely discussed study of the Court is an interesting milestone.
Strictly speaking his famous critique is rooted in a doctrinal approach
to constitutionalism: The Court "got it wrong," meaning that it departed from acceptable (normative) and accepted (empirical) interpretative standards. But to say, from within European law, that the
Court got it wrong in its most important constitutional decisions, and
to say it with such fresh rudeness, was a major development. But
Rasmussen's book does more than that: by making it meaningful to
ask whether the Court's rulings were accepted rather than acceptable,
by treating the Court as a political actor and introducing openly the
question of judicial politics, by making it relevant who the actual
judges were (rather than treating it as a disembodied institutional
voice), by highlighting in print the existence of a critical discourse
among academics who were not, however, ready to go to print, he was
breaking a whole series of taboos.
Francis Snyder's admirable New Directions in EuropeanCommunity Law, the first chapter of which is manifesto, agenda and methodology, is the best, in English, for insightful and expanded European
legal discourse of constitutionalism. The new directions are not only
in the areas he discusses but in the way they are discussed. There are
now, embryonically, a European law sociology and a sociology of European law. There is also doctrinal discourse which is fully attuned to
the gocio-political context in which it is situated and which often conditions its contours and is increasingly attuned to its own position. A
group of young Turks in Britain exemplified by the Shaw and More
volume on the New Legal Dynamics of the Union is testimony to a
changing legal landscape.
Marking the arrival of this field, there is even a successful new
journal, The EuropeanLaw Journal,the subtitle of which - Review of
European Law in Context - is indication of the maturity of discourse
within the law.
THE

CHURCH OF CONSTITUTIONALISM

Is UNDER

CHALLENGE

Except for a small fringe, the challenge to constitutionalism is not
revolutionary, for example a claim to overturn the ancien regime, but
is more in the nature of a reformation, with its historical religious connotations. It is not about breaking faith; it is about affirming faith. It
is in at least that sense conservative, and in this case, it is consolidat366
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ing, retracting some of the more extravagant modernist promises of
the heady early days. And yet, at one and the same time, reformation
introduces a challenge to core articles of faith and foundations. Reformation is, thus, far more radical than evolution, far more grounded
than revolution. The reformation of constitutionalism takes place
alongside the convergent evolution of constitutionalization in general
international law.
What are the signs of the challenge to classical constitutionalism
which justify talking of reformation? They are, like the early elements
from which we constructed the constitutional image, varied and disparate. They take place in both constitutionalization and constitutionalism and in all the gradations which take place between these two
phenomena. This essay will eventually focus on the challenge to, and
possible reformulation of, some of the key legal doctrines that comprise constitutionalization. But before we turn to these, it is useful to
provide a non-exhaustive list of developments that can be considered
part of the challenge.
* There are challenges from the collectivity of member states of the
European Union. Consider first the Maastricht Treaty itself. In a
praiseworthy and deservedly famous article reflecting on the constitu-

tional dimensions of Maastricht, entitled "The Constitutional Structure
of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces," Deidre Curtain criticizes
the fragmentation and constitutional incoherence of the Union structure
and has, too, harsh words for a certain assault on the Court in the Maastricht process.
* There are challenges from individual member states. In the Maastricht process it was the United Kingdom and Denmark. In the current
IGC there is a Franco-German (1)draft which contemplates such variable geometry as to make the Community pillar itself one of bits and
pieces. Whether it will be accepted is neither here nor there; it is evidence of the challenge to what was considered a veritable orthodoxy. In
the same breath one can mention the breathtaking proposal to amend
Article 189a which requires unanimity to modify a Commission proposal. A better targeted attack on the constitutional powers of the Commission is more difficult to imagine. This proposal is sure not to pass,
but it is a sign of the attack on the acquis.
* There are challenges from constitutional actors within member
states. Most interestingly to the theme of constitutionalism are the challenges coming from the national judiciary and in particular the highest
courts. The German Constitutional Court and its Belgian counterpart
have been most explicit. But there are signs from others as well, challenging precisely the hegemony of the European Court of Justice. There
has been an understandable reaction trying to minimize and paper over
the cracks. But it is there for anyone who wishes to look.
* There are challenges from, yes, new constituencies within the Court
of Justice. (We should not commit the error of imagining the Court as a
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monolithic actor free of internal factions, disagreements and internal
conflicted views on many issues, including the contours of constitutionalism. The oft-deep divisions on fundamental issues between advocates
general - full Members of the Court - and the Court itself surely mirror
similar divisions within the College of Judges.) Consider the post-Maastricht jurisprudence of the Court itself - for example its famous (or, to
some, infamous) Keck Decision or other controversial decisions such as
Opinion 1/96. Assailed by many champions of the Single Market as a
heresy, Norbert Reich used the Keck Decision among those justifying
his analysis of a veritable economic constitutional revolution.
* There are challenges from general public opinion in several member
states. Maastricht, refreshingly, gave the lie to years of a Eurobarometer
ostrich syndrome. It is clear that Euroskepticism is not just another
English vice. At a minimum, Europe is no longer part of consensus,
nonpartisan politics in many Member States, not least the new ones. As
suggested above, though the discontent is in many instances non-specific,
it goes often to what one would consider the constitutional acquis.
It is hard to gauge the depth behind these challenges and it is
even harder to explain the reasons for them. We offer some speculations on what may account for this change of mood.
* As regards governments and states, one explanation must rest with
the hugely expanded role of majority voting which came into effect with
the Single European Act. How and why the governments accepted this
sea-change is a story for another day. Clearly majority voting has been
fundamental in the ability of the Community to move ahead with the
creation of a single market (of sorts) and has generally transformed the
climate of decision-making. But it also removed one of the key political
artifacts that had facilitated the acceptability of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism with a veto and without a veto are two very different
games and what we are seeing in the challenges of member states - individual and collective - is an adjustment to that reality.
* We will not dwell here much on courts which must be the subject of
another essay. The dialogue between the European Court and national
courts has become more complex, nuanced and, at times, terse. In part
courts are part of their national context and reflect the changing mood
of public opinion, both elite and popular. In part certain strands of the
European jurisprudence and certain failures of the European Court (as
perceived by its interlocutors) in such areas as competences, have become more visible and less acceptable. In part the national challenges
are a paradoxical sign of an acknowledgment by national courts of the
constitutional nature of the European Court's posture. It is, strangely,
easier to deal with the doctrinal elements of constitutionalism (which
after all constitutes the official vocabulary of the inter-court dialogues)
when they can be pigeonholed as international law, and therefore, taken
less seriously. A constitutional-constitutional dialogue has its inbuilt
conflictual elements. Likewise, while reserving chapter and verse for another occasion, all of the "strange" decisions of the European Court
should be seen as part of its response both to the general European con-
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text in which it finds itself and as part of its dialogue with a much more
difficult national interlocutor.
" The change in general public opinion is most interesting and conditions much of the other responses.
* There is, first, what one could term the paradox of success. In its
foundational period, the European construct was perceived as part of a
moral imperative in dealing with the heritage of World War II. Governments and states may have been happily pursuing their national interest
but the European construct could be cloaked with a noble mantle of a
new-found idealism. Within Europe, war may be possible but it is certainly unthinkable. With that huge success of its principal objective,
what Europe now is presented as delivering is bread and circus. Remove
the moral imperative, remove the mantle of ideals, and it's politics as
usual with the frustrating twist that in Europe you cannot throw the
scoundrels out at election time. So you try and throw the whole construct out.
* Arguably, public attitudes go even deeper than that. We come here
to a more sobering consideration in this regard, whereby the European
Union may be seen not simply as having suffered a loss of its earlier
spiritual values, but as an actual source of social ressentiment. Here are
the highlights of what surely deserves much more than this superficial
summary.
0 In his pre-choleric days, Ernst Nolte wrote a fascinating study on the
origins of fascism in its various European modes. Consider, chillingly,
the turn to fascism in Italy, France and Germany at the beginning of the
20th century. In his profound comparative analysis of the cultural-political roots of the phenomenon, the common source was identified as a
reaction to some of the manifestations of modernity.
* At a pragmatic level, the principal manifestations of modernity were
the increased bureaucratization of life, public and private; the depersonalization of the market (through mass consumerism, brand names and
the like) and the commodification of values; the "abstractism" of social
life, especially through competitive structures of mobility; rapid urbanization and the centralization of power.
* At an epistemological level, modernity was premised on, and experienced in, an attempt to group the world into intelligible concepts which
had to be understood through reason and science - abstract and universal categories. On this reading, fascism was a response to, and an exploitation of, the angst generated by these practical and cognitive
challenges. Up to here this is a fairly well known story.
* Eerily, at the end of the 20th century, the European Union can be
seen as replicating, in reality or in the subjective perception of individuals and societies, some of these very same features: it has come to symbolize, unjustly perhaps, the epitome of bureaucratization and, likewise,
the epitome of centralization. One of its most visible policies, the Common Agriculture Policy, has had historically the purpose of "rationalizing" farm holdings which, in effect, meant urbanization. The single
market, with its emphasis on competitiveness and transnational movement of goods, can be perceived as a latter day thrust at increased com-
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modification of values (consider how the logic of the Community forces
a topic such as abortion to be treated as a "service") and depersonalization of, this time round, the entire national market. Not only have local
products come under pressure, even national products have lost their
distinctiveness. The very transnationalism of the Community, which earlier on was celebrated as a reinvention of Enlightenment idealism, is just
that: universal, rational, transcendent and wholly modernist.
* To this sustained and never resolved angst of modernity we have
new, fin de sij¢le added phenomena as illuminated brilliantly by Brian
Fitzgerald.
• To capture these phenomena we can resort to what Jose Ortega y
Gasset called creencias - the certainties of life which needed no proof both in the physical and social world: Water falls downward, there is a
difference between machines and humans, higher forms of life differentiate by gender, etc. To the sustained challenge of modernity is added a
profound shattering of the most fundamental creencias - deeper still, a
shattering of the ability to believe in anything. It is worth tracing some
of the manifestations of this process.
• There is first, or was, for a sustained period in this century, the assault of the reductive social sciences. Not only are things not what they
seem to be, but their reality always has a cynical malevolence. Public life
and its codes mask power and exploitation; private life with its codes
masks domination. By an inevitable logic this assault turned on itself,
whereby the illumination brought by these insights was not a vehicle for
liberation but in itself for manipulation. The epistemic challenge of
post-modernism deepens the shattering. For, in the old, modernist perspectives, there was at least a truth to be explored, vindicated - even if
that truth was one of power, exploitation and domination. One can find
distasteful the post-modernist self-centered, ironic, sneering posturing.
But, without adjudicating the philosophical validity of its epistemic
claim, there is no doubt that the notion that all observations are relative
to the perception of the observer, that what we have are just competing
narratives, has moved from being a philosophic position to a social reality. It is part of political discourse: multiculturalism is premised on it as
are the breakdown of authority (political, scientific, social) and the ascendant culture of extreme individualism and subjectivity. Indeed, objectivity itself is considered a constraint on freedom - a strange
freedom, empty of content. Finally, the shattering of so many creencias
(of the notion of creencia itself) has found a powerful manifestation in
the public forum: it is dominated by television which distrusts and, by its
pandering, non-judgmental transmission or cheap moralization, undermines creencias. This occurs in a vertical forum in which each viewer is
isolated and addressed alone, unable to hear and join the objections of
other viewers.
0 To the angst of modernity is added the end of century fragmentation
of information, and the disappearance of coherent world view, belief in
belief and belief in the ability to know let alone control.
; There are many social responses to these phenomena. One of them
has been a turn, by many, to any force which seems to offer "meaning."
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Almost paradoxically, but perhaps not, the continued pull of the nation
state, and the success in many societies of extreme forms of nationalism
(measured not only in votes and members but in the ability of those
extreme forms to shift the center of the public debate) are, in part of
course, due to the fact that the nation and state are such powerful vehicles in responding to the existential craving for meaning and purpose
whibh modernity and post-modernity seem to deny. The nation and
state, with their organizing myths of fate and destiny, provide a captivating and reassuring answer to many.
e Here too the failure of Europe is colossal. Just as Europe fuels the
angst of modernity it also feeds the angst of post-modernity: giant and
fragmented at the same time, built as much on image as on substance, it
is incomprehensible and challenges increasingly the creencias of national
daily life. This is not to suggest that Europe is about to see a return to
fascism, nor most certainly should this analysis, if it has any merit, give
joy to fin-de-sicle chauvinists, whose wares today are as odious as they
were at the start of the century. But it does suggest a profound change
in its positioning in public life: not, as in its founding period, as a response to a crisis of confidence, but 50 years later as one of the causes of
that crisis. Constitutionalism - but for the sake of what?
* Finally, last and least, there is also a change in the academic discourse of constitutionalism. Recall those two remarkable articles by
Curtain and Reich. Their critique is as telling as the phenomena criticized. The implicit view from which it is made is the classical European
constitutional vision which privileges an image of a mono-centered, vertically integrated, polity. It is a view of a single "Single Market" as a
privileged constitutional value, part of the economic constitution of the
Union, of an authoritative Court which enjoys and deserves deference
both from national courts and all other political actors, of a respect for
member state diversity which, however, has to be subject to a Community discipline in the sphere of application of Community law. In short,
exactly the Stein vision of European constitutionalism as a ".... framework for a federal-type structure in Europe." To the extent that the single market is viewed as a peremptory norm, without the possibility that
other norms are posited because the other norms are either outside the
jurisdictional bounds of the Community or are not reflected in the Community legislative process, it was predictable that centralization of authority would follow.
e Maastricht does represent a "rebellion" against that image of constitutionalism. It is clear that the principal raison d'etre of the pillar structure, with the meticulous and explicit attempt to exclude the Court, was
the wish of the Member States to operate outside the European constitutional structure. And if one finds a certain emotional edge in the articles
dealing with decisions of the European Court in cases such as Keck and
others like it, this is understandable. These decisions are painful since
they seem like a betrayal from within the Vatican itself.
e The Weltanschauung from which the critique is made is also totally
understandable. It is entirely consistent with the repeated vocabulary of
classical European constitutionalism. Consider the legal underpinnings
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of constitutionalism in, say, Article 177, with its explicit rationale of a
uniform interpretation (and application) of Community law. This view
has a pragmatic rationale to it, as well as embodying a certain vision of
equality before the law. But is it not too the par-excellence monocentric
view of the polity? Or of the potent idea of the rule of law which, in the
rhetoric of the European Court, meant that any legal act is to be subject
to judicial scrutiny. This is noble and in many ways persuasive. But it
has, too, far reaching consequences to the primordial self-positioning of
the Court. And to anyone who grew up on Dassonville as an article of
faith affirming not only the substantive unity of the market, but also the
subjection of any fragmentation to Euro-scrutiny, the notion of exclusion from such scrutiny a la Keck is sacrilege. Exclusion is certainly inconsistent with Dassonville's audacious grab for centralized power, but
is it inconsistent with a reformed and consolidated constitutionalism?
0 We witness in recent years the emergence of a new academic discourse which attempts to rethink the very way in which classical constitutionalism was conceptualized. The most powerful and influential voice
is that of MacCormick in his trilogy: Beyond the Sovereign State; Sovereignty, Democracy and Subsidiarity; and Liberalism, Nationalism and
the Post-SovereignState. Here is a voice that understands the impossibilities of the old constitutional discourse, in a polity and a society in which
the key social and political concepts on which classical constitutionalism
was premised have lost their meaning. Note in particular two of the
hallmarks of this new reformed discussion. The first is a more explicitly
normative and critical discussion of constitutionalism. The second is its
challenges to the dualist prism of the traditional constitutional image.
The dualist approach places the relationship between Community/
Union and the member states at the center of the discourse and, likewise, places a huge premium on a hierarchy of norms - centrist and
uniform - as a representation of, and resolution to, constitutional conflict. The new reformed discussion - in MacCormick, de Areilza,
Dehousse, Joerges - recognizes and at times suggests a different, "horizontal," "poly-centered," "infranational" image of the European polity
and its constitutional framework.
Let us represent here a discussion of particular challenges to the
old constitutionalism as they relate to some of the core articles of faith
and then present some suggestions for a reformed discussion of those
concepts.
DiREcr EFFECt AND CITIZENSHIP, SUPREMACY AND DEMOS
Direct effect and supremacy are at the core of the constitutional
construct: if constitutionalization is the finite process by which the EC
treaties evolved from a set of legal arrangements binding upon sover-

eign states, into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring judicially enforceable rights and obligations on all legal persons and
entities, public and private, within the sphere of application of EC
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law, then direct effect and supremacy are essential conditions for constitutionalization. Doctrinal constitutionalism sought to root (or critique) direct effect and supremacy in an acceptable and accepted
hermeneutics. Political science has tried to explore the systemic implications of the doctrines and the dynamics of the constitutional conversation about them.
The reformation described in this essay has begun to address a
new question: by what authority, then, if any - understood in the vocabulary of normative political theory - can the claim of European
law to be both constitutionally superior and with immediate effect in
the polity be sustained? Who is the constituent power? Why should
the subjects of European law in the Union, individuals, courts, governments, etc., feel bound to observe the law of the Union as higher law,
in the same way that their counterparts in, say, the United States are
bound, to and by, U.S. federal law? It is a dramatic question since
constitutionalization has formally taken place and to give a negative
answer - as has recently been given by actors and "observers" - would

be tantalizingly subversive. The failure to address this question is
partly why the critique of European Union constitutional democracy
is often conflicted. One can, it seems, proclaim a profound democracy
deficit and yet insist at the same time on the importance of accepting
the supremacy of Union law. It is a dramatic question too, since it
goes to membership, to citizenship and nationality and, thus, seems to
bring European constitutionalism into direct conflict with the constitutionalism of its Member States. To whom is primary allegiance
owed? By whom is it owed? Of course the articulation of this question demonstrates its fundamental incoherence. This essay concludes
that there are multiple allegiances and therefore multiple centers of
power, and that we cannot point to a single constituent power or institutional fount of sovereignty.
One place to look for the answer to the issue of normative authority would be international law. The high contracting powers - the
member states of the European Community - entered into an international treaty based on international law which created an organization
with these wide capacities and established its institutions empowered
to exercise the various powers. What, then, of authority? On this
view the transnational authority of the Community writ, so long as jus
cogens was not violated (and it clearly was not), derives from international law: pacta sunt servanda. The internal authority of the Community writ, so long as internal constitutional norms were not violated
(and apparently they were not) derives from the constitutional author-
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ity which governments enjoy to engage their respective states, including the authority to undertake international obligations with internal
ramifications in national law. The nature of the European polity on
this reading is an international organization belonging to the states
that created it.
For a long time the international law view has been out of vogue,
and for a long time, the international law view has been myopic. Despite its terse elegance the international view runs against one of the
great orthodoxies of the system: if we look to the rhetoric of the European Court in the celebrated Van Gend en Loos case - the embodiment of constitutional orthodoxy - the Community is not an "old"
order of international law; it is more than an agreement which merely
creates mutual obligations between the contracting states. Rather,
"... the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law
for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign
rights. .

..

"I

In subsequent cases the Court dropped the reference to international law altogether and in the 1980s, in cases such as Les Verts, it
referred to the treaties as the constitutional charter of the
Community.
The internationalist view does not simply contradict this rhetoric.
Given the massive transfer of competences to the Community, the unprecedented empowerment of Community institutions (and through
them, indirectly, of the executive branch of the Member States at the
expense of, say, national parliaments) and the consequent creation of
considerable democratic deficiencies in central aspects of European
public life, the internationalists' construct provides a poor legitimation
to this new architecture of power.
But if we reject the internationalist view as grounding direct effect and -supremacy what comes in its place? Answering this question
is exactly where, at least in the first place, political theory has to replace social science. Political theory tells us that the international
view is as accurate as the domestic view: that power is divided and
that there are no absolutes. It does not seem to matter whether international law is the fount of all authority, authorizing sovereignty and
hence domestic constitutionality, or whether power flows the other
way, with domestic constitutions authorizing the formation of international law. The flow of authority is bidirectional.
3 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie van Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R.
1, 12, C.M.L.R. 105 (1963).
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While there is no single institutional fount of authority, political
theory provides a single earthly fount of authority. In Western, liberal
democracies, under one guise or another, public authority requires legitimation through one principal source: the citizens constituting the
political subjects of the polity. The principal hallmark of citizenship is
not simply the enjoyment of human rights characterized by their extension to all in their quality as humans rather than citizens. The
deepest, most clearly engraved hallmark of citizenship in our democracies is that in citizens vests the power, by majority, to create binding
norms, to shape the political, social and economic direction of the polity. More realistically, in citizens vests the power to enable and habilitate representative institutions which will exercise governance on
behalf of, and for, citizens.
Note too, that this huge privilege and power of citizenship has,
traditionally, come with duties - not simply a duty to obey the norms
(that falls on non-citizens too) but a duty of loyalty to the polity with
well known classical manifestations. Citizenship is so basic that, for
the most part, it is simply assumed in democratic political theory
which engages mostly the .conditions and practice of its exercise. This
theory is challenged by the notion of dual citizenship in vertical terms:
citizenship of both the member state and the Union. We address potential resolutions of this challenge below. Here, it is sufficient to note
that divided citizenship implies fractured loyalties.
One might think that this issue has been addressed in the Community constitutional architecture. In the same Van Gend en Loos we
read: "Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community
law . . . not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also in-

tended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal
heritage."
This phrase wonderfully sharpens the issue: For here are obligations imposed on individuals independently of the legislation of member states. Member state legislation derives its authority and
legitimacy to impose obligations on individuals because it is made by,
or in the name of, its subjects - the citizens of the member states. If
Community law imposes obligations independently of the legislation
of member states, who are its subjects?
Surely this is where the legal doctrine of direct effect is so significant. For direct effect purports not simply to address the issue of the
status of norms (so essential to individuals qua litigants - and thus to
their lawyers) but also the political status and identity of the subjects
of those norms.
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Lawyers recite dutifully that the ... Community constitutes a
new legal order ... for the benefit of which the states have limited
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of
which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals."
Individuals, not only states, are thus subjects. Semantically, in
English, "subjects" is often synonymous with citizenship. The
Queen's subjects of old are the present citizens of the Realm. It could
seem, thus, that in the very articulation of one of the principal "constitutionalizing" doctrines - direct effect - the condition for its authority
was provided by elevating individuals to the status of full subjects
alongside member states.
But this would be a highly problematic construction.
Direct effect means that obligations among states created by a
treaty confer rights on individuals which courts must protect, even
against their own statal public authorities. It is in this sense that calling individuals subjects of the treaty alongside member states may be
justified. But note, individuals are "subjects" only in the (direct) effect of the law. In this sense alone is Europe a new legal order. Consider the following reductio ad absurdum: Imagine three states which
still allow slavery. There is trade among these states, including trade
in slaves. Imagine further that the three get together and conclude a
treaty that creates mutual obligations among them such as prohibiting
a workday for slaves of more than 20 hours. They also create institutions empowered to regulate all matters concerning slavery. Imagine
now that they do not wait for a judicial decision but include explicitly
in their treaty what the ECI "found" in Van Gend en Loos: That these
obligations, are, independently of national legislation, intended to create rights for the slaves themselves, and that national courts would
have to protect those rights. Another new legal order will have come
into being. Does the fact that the obligations created by the states, the
high contracting parties which bestow rights on our poor slaves make
them subjects of the treaty? Yes in the limited sense of deriving rights
created by others. No, in the sense that they have no say in the making of those rights. Enjoying rights created by others does not make
you a full subject of the law. Thus, in Van Gend en Loos, to the extent
that the high contracting parties retained the prerogatives to make the
obligations, bestowing rights on individuals, there was, in this sense,
little new in the legal order, except that it accentuated the problem of
legitimacy. For if the Community and Union have the capacity to exercise law-making power over individuals independently of national
legislation, by whose authority does it enjoy that power? Again, we
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have lost the ability to identify a discrete and unified institutional locus of power.
One could object to this absurd example and claim that in the
Union context the Member States are composed of citizens, not
slaves; citizens who enabled their States to create institutions which
create obligations. One could object further that the act of authorization of the treaties, which bestow these powers on the Community, by
national parliaments provides the authority. That is true, but note
how that argument reintroduces legitimation through the mediation of
the State and authority through public international law, thus waving
good-bye to the "new legal order" and constitutionalization. That argument relies, without analysis, on the democratic nature of national
politics. It appears that the new legal order and constitutionalization
only addressed half of the citizen-state relationship: the effect of law
as a source of claims, but not the formation of law.
To use our current vocabulary, though the Community seen
through the eyes of Van Gend recognized nationals as subjects in one
sense (effect of law), it stripped them of citizenship in the sense of
direct participation. One paradox, then, has been that the very doctrine which is foundational to European constitutionalism is, at the
same time, its denial.
Citizens constitute the demos of the polity. This is the other, collective side, of the citizenship coin. Demos provides another way of
expressing the link between citizenship and democracy. Democracy
does not exist in a vacuum. It is premised on the existence of a polity
with members - the demos - by whom and for whom democratic discourse with its many variants takes place. The authority and legitimacy of a majority to compel a minority exists only within political
boundaries defined by a demos.
Simply put, if there is no demos, there can be no operating democracy. If the European Community lacks an operating democracy,
how can it be a community? Is there, can there be, a European demos
which would legitimate the authority of European constitutionalism?
Can this European demos be arrayed against national demoi where
they conflict?
As part of the reformation debate, there has emerged an articulate and powerful No Demos Thesis. One implication of this thesis,
espoused, among others, by the German Constitutional Court, is to
deny any meaningful democratization of the Union at the European
level, to reassert the implicit underpinning of the Community legal
order in international law, and if one is to be intellectually consistent,
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to negate likewise any meaningful content to European citizenship.
Space does not perpait full elaboration but a few hints will suffice.
Under this view, the nation or the people, which is the modem
expression of demos, constitutes the basis for the modem democratic
state. The nation and its members - which need not be irredentist but
may be defined in many different ways - constitutes the polity for the
purposes of accepting the discipline of democratic, majoritarian governance. Both descriptively and prescriptively (how it is and how it
ought to be) a minority will/should accept the legitimacy of a majority
decision because both majority and minority are part of the same demos, the same people. That is an integral part of what rule-by-thepeople, democracy, means on this reading. Typically (though not necessarily) the state constitutes the arena, and defines the political
boundaries within which the nation/people exercise their democratic
power. The significance of the political boundary is not only to the
older notion of political independence and territorial integrity, but
also to the very democratic nature of the polity. A parliament is, on
this view, an institution of democracy not only because it provides a
mechanism for representation and majority voting, but because it represents the demos, often the nation, from which derive the authority
and legitimacy of its decisions. To drive this point home, imagine an
anschluss between Germany and Denmark. Try and tell the Danes
that they should not worry since they will have full representation in
the Bundestag. Their screams of grief will be shrill not simply because
they will be condemned, as Danes, to permanent minorityship (that
may be true for the German Greens too), but because the way nationality, in this way of thinking, enmeshes with democracy is that even
majority rule is only legitimate within a demos, when Danes rule
Danes.
Turning to Europe, it is argued as a matter of empirical observation that there is no European demos - not a people and not a nation.
Neither the subjective element (the sense of shared collective identity
and loyalty) nor the objective conditions which could produce these
(the kind of homogeneity of the organic national-cultural conditions
on which peoplehood in the European tradition depend, such as
shared culture, a shared sense of history, a shared means of communication) exist today. Can long-term peaceful relations with thickening
economic and social intercourse be confused with the bonds of peoplehood and nationality forged by language, history, ethnicity and all
the rest?
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The consequences of the No Demos thesis for the European construct are interesting. The rigorous implication of this view would be
that absent a demos, there cannot, by definition, be a democracy or
democratization at the European level. This is not a semantic proposition. On this reading, European democracy (meaning a minimum
binding majoritarian decision-making at the European level) without
a demos is no different from the previously mentioned German-Danish anschluss except on a larger scale. Giving the Danes a vote in the
Bundestag is ice cold comfort. Giving them a vote in the European
Parliament or Council is, conceptually, no different. This would be
true for each and every nation-state. European integration, on this
view, may have involved a certain transfer of state functions to the
Union but this has not been accompanied by a redrawing of political
boundaries which can occur only if, and can be ascertained only when,
a European people can be said to exist. Since this, it is claimed, has
not occurred, the Union and its institutions can have neither the authority nor the legitimacy of a demos-cratic state. Empowering the
European Parliament is no solution and could - to the extent that it
weakens the Council (the voice of the member states) - actually exacerbate the legitimacy problem of the Community. On this view, a parliament without a demos is conceptually impossible, practically
despotic. If the European Parliament is not the representative of a
people, if the territorial boundaries of the EU do not correspond to its
political boundaries, then the writ of such a parliament has only
slightly more legitimacy than the writ of an emperor.
But the problem goes even deeper. The No-Demos thesis in its
strongest version is not descriptive. It is not simply an empirical observation that as yet the conditions for European peoplehood do not
exist. At its most serious the thesis is normative. The telos of European integration is ".

.

. an ever closer union among the peoples of

Europe." Europe is not meant to be about nation building, or a melting pot - quite the contrary. There is no European demos and there
should not be one.
Here, then, is the second paradox. The constitutional architecture is a feature of the Union which defines its uniqueness and, functionally, emerged as necessary for attaining the objective of an ever
closer union among the peoples of Europe. The normative legitimation of this constitutionalism requires a demos, the emergence of
which would however negate that very basic telos. Put differently: to
realize the objectives of the Union in a democratic way, the only way
which enjoys political legitimacy, a European demos would seem nec-
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essary. But a European demos would seem to negate those very
objectives. This paradox may only be solved by the acceptance of the
possibility of multiple demoi.
European citizenship and peoplehood are problematic in another
sense. The "Union among Peoples" telos does not represent a second
best option chosen out of political pragmatism. It is not simply the
most that would be acceptable politically in Europe, but something
falling short of the ideal-type - a European people. The "Union
among Peoples" telos is, instead, a reflection of a deep moral ethos.
The alternative telos, creating one people out of the many, would contradict one of the most basic European ideals: inventing new ways
and contexts which would enable distinct nations and States to thrive,
interact and resolve their conflicts without the disastrous apocalyptic
results witnessed in Europe during the 20th century. The Union
among Peoples is, in part, about creating a political culture which
learns new ways to deal with the other. A European citizenship could
be seen, on this view, as part of a statal telos and an exclusionary
ethos - according to which Europe is about redefining a polity in
which the Us may no longer be Germans or French or Italians and
the Them no longer British, or Dutch or Irish. The Us would become European and the Them, non-European. Of course the question could then be asked: if Europe, part of whose roots were an
attempt to tame the excesses nationalism and the classic nation-state
embrace, were to define a new other, even if "only" at the symbolic
level European citizenship, on what moral ground can one turn
against French National Fronts, German Republicans and their brethren elsewhere who embrace Member State nationalism. On the
ground that they chose the wrong nationalism to embrace?
Is one faced, then, with a tragic choice in which absent citizenship
the normative authority of European constitutionalism would become
untenable but in which the introduction of citizenship would not only
mean a redefinition of the "peoples" Telos, but introduce an exclusionary ethos of dubious moral credentials?
DIRECT

EFFECr

AND SUPREMACY - CITIZENSHIP AND DEMOS:

A R FORMED DEBATE
The choice would, indeed, be tragic if the understanding of European citizenship and European demos were to embrace (a) that strand
in European political thought and praxis which understands nationality in the organic terms of culture and/or language and/or religion
and/or ethnicity; and (b) a new vertical irredentism (creating the pos-
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sibility of horizontal irredentism) that conflates nationality and citizenship so that nationality is a condition for citizenship and citizenship
means nationality.
Is it mandated, we should ask, that demos in general and the European demos in particular be understood exclusively in organic cultural homogeneous terms? Can we not break away from that
tradition and define membership of a polity in civic, non-organic cultural terms? Can we not imagine a demos understood in non-organic
terms, a coming together on the basis not of shared ethnos and/or organic culture, but a coming together on the basis of shared values, a
shared understanding of rights and societal duties and shared rational,
intellectual culture which transcend organic-national differences. Article 8 TEU offers strange promise in this regard.
Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding
the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union [... ].

The introduction of citizenship to the conceptual world of the Union
could be seen as just another step in the drive toward a statal vision of
Europe, especially if citizenship is understood as being premised on
statehood. But there is another more tantalizing and radical way of
understanding the provision, namely as the very conceptual
decoupling of nationality from citizenship and as the conception of a
polity the demos of which, its membership, is understood in the first
place in civic and political rather than ethno-cultural terms. On this
view, the Union belongs to, is composed of, citizens who by definition
do not share the same nationality. The substance of membership (and
thus of the demos) is in a commitment to the shared values of the
Union as expressed in its constituent documents, a commitment, inter
alia, to the duties and rights of a civic society covering discrete areas
of public life, a commitment to membership in a polity which privileges exactly the opposites of nationalism - those human features
which transcend the differences of organic ethno-culturalism. On this
reading, the conceptualization of a European demos should not be
based on real or imaginary trans-European cultural affinities or
shared histories nor on the construction of a European "national"
myth of the type which constitutes the identity of the organic nation.
The decoupling of nationality and citizenship opens the possibility, instead, of thinking of co-existing multiple demoi. Thus it is possible to
conceptualize European demos and citizenship as part of a polity with
multiple political demoi to which its members would belong
simultaneously.
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One objection to this concept of demos and citizenship would be
that it all happens in the space between the ears, that it is cerebral,
rational and lacks the requisite emotional charge and psycho-sociological attraction, which are indispensable for the kind of cohesion, identification and collective identity that are part of the hallmark of
nationality.
One view of multiple demoi, quite common, may consist in
what may be called the "concentric circles" approach. On this approach one feels simultaneously as belonging to, and being part of,
say, Germany and Europe; or, even, Scotland, Britain and Europe.
What characterizes this view is that the sense of identity and identification derives from the same sources of human attachment albeit at
different levels of intensity. Presumably the most intense (which the
state, qua nation, always claims to be) would trump in any normative
conflict. But we must ask at least three questions about this presumption. First, would intense emotion always trump hard logic, where
logic indicates a different governance? Second, is the state representative of its demos or nation? Third, is the emotional attachment to
the state qua nation a passing historical phase, to the limited extent
that the emotional attachment to the tribe has passed in some parts of
the world?
The view of multiple demoi suggested, one of truly variable geometry, invites individuals to see themselves as belonging simultaneously to more than one demos, based, critically, on different
subjective factors of identification. I may be a German national, or
French or Italian, in the in - reaching strong sense of organic - cul-

tural identification and sense of belongingness with all the attendant
emotional charge that may (at least to many) seem necessary and positive. I may simultaneously be a European citizen in terms of my European transnational affinities to shared values that transcend the
organic-national diversity and which are the subject not of emotional
identification but of reflective, deliberative rational choice. So much
so, that in a range of areas of public life, I am willing to accept the
legitimacy and authority of decisions adopted by my fellow European
citizens in the realization that in these areas I have given preference to
choices made by my outreaching demos, rather than by my in-reaching demos.
On this view, the Union demos turns away from its antecedents
and understanding in the European nation-state. But equally, it
should be noted, we suggest here something that is different from simple American republicanism transferred to Europe or of Habermas-
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sian constitutional patriotism transferred to Europe. Americanism
was too, after all, about nation building albeit on different premises.
Its end state, its myth, as expressed in the famous Pledge of Allegiance to the America Flag - "One Nation, Indivisible, Under God" is not what Europe is about at all: Europe is precisely not about One
Nation, not about a Melting Pot and all the rest, for despite the unfortunate rhetoric of Unity, Europe remains (or ought to remain) committed to ".

..

an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe."

Likewise, it is not about indivisibility nor, blessedly, about God. And
the Habermas concept was to provide a new basis for traditional German nationalism. What's more, both these other concepts continue to
conflate citizenship and nationality even if making the latter conditional on, even synonymous with the former.
Critically, on this view, European citizenship has no independent
existence without member state nationality. They are ontologically
dependent on each other, although European citizenship may, over
time, diminish the number of threads that form the fabric of member
state nationality. No-one any longer sees the nation-state as the
model for international law or organization. A more complex model
is required.
According to the multiple demos concept suggested here, there is
a recognition of both the force and the potential value in the survival
of the traditional European nation-state imbued with the force of national identification, cultural differentiation, a vision in which the
Tower of Babel dispersal was not a punishment but a blessing. The
Eros of nationalism is, thus, recognized and approved. But there is
also, or should be also especially in the European tradition, an acknowledgment of the huge destructive potential, moral and physical,
of nationhood unchecked. Nationalism, of all types - German,
French, American - evokes fate and destiny in constructing its mobilizing myths. Indeed, as mentioned above, it is by evoking fate and
destiny that nationalism can respond to the deepest existential yearning in a secular age, that of giving meaning and purpose to life which
extends beyond mere existence or selfish fulfillment. Who am I? A
member of "a great" nation, is the national answer. What and why am
I here for? To serve national destiny. That is the pull and the claim of
nationality and its embodiment in the state. Religion, with greater
legitimacy, occupies itself with these deeper recesses of the human
spirit and it is not surprising that in its iconography the nation state
appropriates religious imagery, often latent. The mixing of state loyalty and religion risks, of course, idolatry from a religious perspective
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and can be highly dangerous from a political one. Historically, it
seems as if yolk and staat, blood and soil, did indeed come to occupy
these deepest parts of the human spirit to the point of being accepted
"uber alles" with terrifying consequences. It is not that the very idea
of nation and state was murderous nor even evil. It is the primordial
position which Nation mixed with State occupied, instilling uncritical
citizenship which allowed evil, even murderous designs to be executed
by dulling critical personal faculties, legitimating extreme positions,
subduing transcendent human values and debasing one of the common strands of the three monotheistic religions that human beings, all
of them, were created in the image of God.
How does one tame this tantalizing but terrifying eros? Not by
replacing the national with the European. It is in this sense that the
creation of alternatives, such as the European Community, seems to
expose the state to the freshening wind of vertical competition, facilitating critical citizenship. Supranational citizenship, more deliberative, rational, transcendent, but perhaps with its own cooler eros - is
the civilizing force which is to help keep the hot-blooded Eros of the
-nation at bay. The European construct we have put forward, which
allows" for a European civic, value-driven demos co-existing side by
side with a national organic-cultural one (for those nation-states that
want it), could be seen as a deeply conservative construct. However,
it is designed to reestablish a new framework for a new epoch in the
life of the European nation state, and, at the same time, give legitimacy to the normative claims of European constitutionalism. For on
this reading, the treaties would have to be seen not only as an agreement among states (a Union of States) but as a "social contract"
among the nationals of those states that they will in the areas covered
by the Treaty regard themselves as associating as citizens in this civic
society. Nationals of the Member States are European Citizens, not
the other way around. Europe is "not yet" a demos in the organic
national-cultural sense and need never become one.
Maybe in the realm of the political, the special virtue of contemporaneous membership in an organic national-cultural demos and in a
supranational civic, value-driven demos is in the effect which such
double membership may have on taming the great appeal, even craving, for belonging and destiny in this world which nationalism continues to offer but which can so easily degenerate to intolerance and
xenophobia. Maybe in the reaching national-cultural demos and the
outreaching supranational civic demos, by continuously keeping each
other in check, offer a structured model of critical citizenship. Is this
384
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the true definition of subsidiarity: steering between the scylla of fascism due to nationalism borne of insufficient centralization and the
charybdis of fascism due to modernism borne of excess centralization?
One should not get carried away with this construct. Even this
construct of the European demos, like the national-organic construct,
depends on a shift of consciousness. Individuals must think of themselves in this way before such a demos could have full legitimate democratic authority. The key for a shift in political boundaries is the
sense of feeling that the boundaries surround one's own polity. We do
not claim that this shift has already occurred. We simply assert that it
is in this sense we should understand European citizenship and demos
and seek to realize it. This understanding of demos makes the need
for democratization of Europe even more pressing. A demos which
coheres around values must live those values.
JURISDICTIONAL LIMrrS AS FUNDAMENTAL BOUNDARIESBETWEEN TWO CONSTITUTIONALISMS

We turn now to a twinned issue which has also become the subject of reevaluation in the new constitutional debate - the jurisdictional limits of the Union. Let us first invoke a truism of formal
constitutionalism. Although the principle of universal suffrage and
majoritarianism informs all modern systems of democratic governance, it is not an absolute principle. Modern democracies, taking their
cue principally from the American rather than British democratic tradition, increasingly acknowledge a higher law - typically a constitution
- which binds even the legislature. In an increasing number of modem democracies, the higher law is backed up by courts and a system
of judicial review which give it, so to speak, teeth. Within this constitutional ethos judicial protection of fundamental human rights has a
central place. Constitutionalism, despite its counter-majoritarian effect, is regarded as a complimentary principle to majoritarianism
rather than its negation. One formulation which describes the complex relationship between the two is the notion of protection against a
tyranny of the majority - seemingly an oxymoron. We will not enter
into the complex theoretical discussion of rights and their relationship
to democracy. The appeal of rights, whatever the theoretical justification, has to do with two roots. The first of these two roots regards
fundamental rights as an expression of a vision of humanity which
vests the deepest values in the individual which, hence, may not be
compromised by anyone. Probably one of the oldest and most influential sources of this vision is to be found in the Pentateuch: And
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God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He
him. (Gen.I:27). With this pedigree, what legislator has the authority
to transgress the essential humanity of the species? Naturally, there
are secular, humanist parallels aplenty. The other root for the great
appeal of rights and part of the justification of their
countermajoritarian semblance looks to them as an instrument for the
per-se value of putting constraints on power. Modem democracy
emerges, after all, also as a rejection of absolutism and absolutism is
not the monopoly of kings and emperors.
Similar sentiments inform the great appeal of fundamental
boundaries in non-unitary systems - federal states and the European
Union. We use the term "fundamental boundaries" as a way of conceptualizing in a normative sense the principle of enumerated powers
or limited competences of the central authorities in these systems.
The appeal of fundamental boundaries rests in two parallel roots..
First as an expression of a vision of humanity which vests the deepest
values in individual communities existing within larger polities which,
thus, may not be transgressed. The vision of humanity derives from
an acknowledgment of the social nature of humankind, as a counterbalance to the potential atomism of fundamental rights - And the
Lord God said: It is not good that man should be alone (Gen. 1:18) and from the realization that smaller social units can suffer parallel
oppression to individuals by stronger societal forces. That enumeration is also said to work as a firewall against aggreghtion of power is
its second appeal, which is the basis behind the Catholic origins of
subsidiarity.

We are unaware of any federal system that does not claim to give
expression to these notions. But there are as many variants as there
are systems. Comparative analysis can be particularly alluring here.
In Europe there has been a practical eruption of the hitherto dormant
question of Community "competences and powers," a question and
debate which has found its code in the deliciously vague word, term
and concept of subsidiarity. This is inevitably connected to the continued preoccupation with governance structures and processes, balance
between Community and member state and the democracy and legitimacy of the Community. With multiple goals and various ways to collate and assimilate them, we might say that each communal decision,
each piece of legislation, or each "package deal," or perhaps the
whole mechanism that provides the constitutional basis for a continuing series of package deals, represents a separate telos. Each separately conceived telos confounds the search for a, discrete coherent
386
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1. What Accounts for This Eruption?
First a bit of history. The student of comparative federalism discovers a constant feature in practically all federative experiences: a
tendency, which differs only in degree, toward controversial concentration of legislative and executive power in the center/general power
at the expense of constituent units. This is apparently so independently of the mechanism for allocation of jurisdiction/competences/
powers between center and "periphery." Differences, where they occur, are dependent more on the ethos and political culture of polities
rather than on mechanical devices.
The Community has both shared and differed from this general
experience. It has shared it in that the Community, especially in the
1970's, has seen a weakening of any workable and enforceable mechanism for allocation of jurisdiction/competences/powers between Community and its Member States. How has this occurred? It has
occurred by a combination of two factors:
(a) Profligate legislative practices especially in, for example, the usage
of Article 235.
(b) A bifurcated jurisprudence of the Court which on the one hand extensively interpreted the reach of the jurisdiction/competences/powers
granted the Community and on the other hand has taken a self-limiting
approach toward the expansion of Community jurisdiction/competence/
powers when exercised by the political organs.
To make the above statement is not tantamount to criticizing the
Community, its political organs or the Court. This is a question of
values. It is a sustainable thesis that this process was overall beneficial, in its historical context, to the evolution and well-being of Community, member states and their citizens and residents. But this
process was also a ticking constitutional time bomb which one day
could threaten the evolution and stability of the Community. Sooner
or later, "supreme" courts in the member states would realize that the
"socio-legal contract" announced by the Court in its major constitutionalizing decisions, namely that "the Community constitutes a new
legal order.., for the benefit of which the states have limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields" had been shattered, that
although they (the "supreme" courts) had accepted the principles of
the new legal order - supremacy and direct effect - the fields no
longer seemed anymore to be limited, and that in the absence of Coin-
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munity legislative or legal checks it would fall on them to draw the
jurisdictional lines between the Community and its member states.
The interesting thing about the Community experience, and this
is where it does not share the experience of other federative polities, is,
that despite the massive legislative expansion of Community jurisdiction/competences/powers there had not (until Maastricht) been any
political challenge or crisis on this issue from the member states. How
so? The answer is simple and obvious and resides in the pre-Single
European Act decision-making process. Unlike federal states, the
governments of the member states themselves (jointly and severally)
could control absolutely the legislative expansion of jurisdiction-competences-powers. Nothing that was done could be done without the
assent of all national capitals.. This fact diffused any sense of threat
and crisis on the part of governments.
This era passed with the shift to majority voting after the entry
into force of the SEA and the seeds - indeed the buds - of crisis

became visible. It became simply a matter of time before one of the
national courts would defy the European Court on this issue and that
the member states would become aware that in a process that does
not give them a de jure or de facto veto, the question of jurisdictional
lines has become crucial.
To be sure, the European Court already has jurisdiction to resolve this kind of issue under Article 173 and 177(b) (lack of competences), but since to date no Commission or Council measure has
been struck down for pure and simple lack of competence, our assessment is that this existing provision in itself will not satisfy the fears of
the Member States. And indeed, somewhat later than predicted, the
German Constitutional Court, in its Maastricht decision, rejected the
ECJs claim to exclusive judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz and claimed '
that the limits to Community legislative powers was as much a matter
of German constitutional law as it was a matter of Community law.
As such it, the German Constitutional Court, regards itself as competent, indeed as mandated by the German constitution, to monitor the
jurisdictional limits of the Community legislative process.
Formally, the decision constitutes a flagrant act of defiance vis-avis the European Court of Justice in direct contradiction to its jurisprudence on the power of national courts to declare Community law
invalid. It flies in the face, inter alia, of the third paragraph of Article
177. It is also untenable in a legal functionalist sense: There would be
as many fundamental boundaries to the Community as there are
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member states. And how can the same Community measure be considered intra-viresin one member state and ultra-vires in another?
But we are faced, here too, with a paradox of constitutionalism.
As MacCormick explains in The Maastricht Urteik Sovereignty Now,
this outcome is an inevitable result from the clash of two constitutionalisms. And, we should add, two constitutionalisms which understand
themselves and each other in classical, mutually exclusive, sovereignty-based fashion.
On this view, there is a conversation taking place here, but it is
the conversation of two super-powers: two institutions with unlimited
authority and the power to destroy at least one world. Somewhat
inappropriately - given the conversation metaphor - we will use some

of the dynamics of the Cold War as a device for evaluating the judicial
Kompetenz-Kompetenz aspect of the Maastricht decision of the German Constitutional Court. But then, alas, we expect hostility by and
toward reformation movements?
On this reading, it is not a declaration of hot war but the commencement of a cold war with its paradoxical guarantee of coexistence following the infamous MAD logic: Mutual Assured
Destruction. For the German Constitutional Court actually to declare
a Community norm unconstitutional rather than simply threaten to do
so, would be an extremely hazardous move, so hazardous as to make
its use unlikely. The use of even a tactical nuclear weapon always was
considered to carry the risk of creating a nuclear domino effect. If
other member state courts followed such a lead, or if other member
state legislatures or governments were to suspend implementation of
the norm on some reciprocity rationale, a veritable constitutional crisis in the Community could become a reality - the legal equivalent of
the Empty Chair political stand-off in the 1960's. It would be hard for
the German government to remedy the situation, especially if the
German Court decision enjoyed general public popularity. Could the
German Constitutional Court, would the German Constitutional
Court, be willing to face the responsibility of dealing such a blow
(rather than a threat of a blow) to European integration?
But the logic of the Cold War is that one has to assume the worst
and to arm as if the other side would contemplate a first strike. The
European Court of Justice would, thus, have to be watching over its
shoulder the whole time, trying to anticipate any potential move by
the German Constitutional Court. It would be careful not to precipitate such a first strike, and to give its critics little basis for arguing that
a first strike was justified.
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If we now abandon the belligerent metaphors (and contemplating
verbal rather than nuclear weapons), it could be argued that this situation is not unhealthy, that the German move is an insistence on a
more polycentric view of constitutional adjudication and will eventually force a more even conversation between the European Court and
its national constitutional counterparts. The German move of the
1990's in relation to competences resembles their prior move in relation to human rights; it was only that move which forced the European Court to take human rights seriously. Thus, the current move
will force the Court to take competences seriously.
This view is not without its functional problems:
* There is no "non proliferation treaty" in the Community structure.
MAD works well, perhaps, in a situation of two superpowers. But there
must be a real fear that other Member State Courts will follow the German lead in rejecting the exclusive judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz of
the ECJ. The more courts adopt the weapon, the greater the chances
that it will be used. Once that happens, it will become difficult to push
the past[e] back into the tube.
* Courts are not the principal Community players. But this square-off
will hve negative effects on the decision making process of the Community. The German government and governments whose Courts will follow the German lead, will surely be tempted to play that card in
negotiation. ("We really cannot compromise on this point, as our Court
will strike it down ....

)

Here, too, there is an interesting paradox. The consistent position of the European Court, as part of its constitutional architecture,
has been that it alone has judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the power
to adjudicate issues concerning the jurisdictional limits of the Community, since those limits are a matter of interpretation of the Treaty.
The German Court, as part of its reassertion of national sovereignty
and insistence of legitimation of the European construct through
statal instrumentalities and the logic of public international law, has
defied this position. It seems that the internationalist logic claimed by
the German Court either negates its own conclusions or must reject at
least one of the cardinal principles of direct effect and supremacy.
Surely the reach of an international treaty is a matter of international
law and depends on the proper interpretation of that treaty. Since the
treaties give the ECJ exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes concerning their proper interpretation, from an internationalist perspective
there can be little foundation to the position of the German Court.
If, however, the European polity constitutes a constitutional order as claimed by the European Court of Justice, then this issue is far
more nuanced. There has been no constitutional convention in Eu390
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rope. European constitutionalism must depend on a common lawtype rationale, one which draws on and integrates the national constitutional orders, and the constitutional discourse in Europe must be
conceived of as a conversation of many actors in a constitutional interpretative community rather than a hierarchical structure with the ECJ
at the top. It is the constitutional perspective, then, which paradoxically, gives credibility to the claim of the German Court. A feature of
neo-constitutionalism in this case would be that the jurisdictional line
(or lines) should be a matter of constitutional conversation, not an
international law diktat.
And yet, the solution offered by the German Court is no conversation either. Since, although the German Court mentions that these
decisions have to be taken in cooperation with the European Court of
Justice, it reserves the last word to itself. A European diktat is simply
replaced by a national one. And the national one is far more destructive, if one contemplates the possibility of 15 different ones.
How, then, can one square this circle? Elsewhere, it has been
suggested as one possible solution the creation of a constitutional
council for the Community, modeled in some ways on its French
namesake. The constitutional council would have jurisdiction only
over issues of competences (including subsidiarity) and would decide
cases submitted to it after a law was adopted but before coming into
force. It could be seized by any Community institution, any member
state or by the European Parliament acting by a majority of its members. Its President would be the President of the European Court of
Justice and its members would be sitting members of the constitutional courts or their equivalents in the member states. Within the
constitutional council no single member state would have a veto
power. The composition would also underscore that the question of
competences is fundamentally one of both national constitutional and
Community constitutional norms but still subject to a Community solution by a Community institution. The principal merit of this proposal, if it has any, is that it gives expression to the fundamental
boundary concern without however compromising the constitutional
integrity of the Community as did the German Maastricht decision.
Since, from a material point of view, the question of boundaries has
an inbuilt indeterminacy, the critical issue becomes not what are the
boundaries but who gets to decide. The composition of the proposed
constitutional council removes the issue, on the one hand, from the
purely political arena; on the other hand, it creates a body which, on
this issue, would, it is hoped, enjoy a greater measure of public confi-
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dence than the ECJ itself. Does this proposal betray a craving for the
mono-centrism of the old Constitutional order?
Why is this proposal superior to MAD? The cold war described
here will never end. As noted above, this cold war is not unhealthy.
Rather, it is a permanent state of human affairs, reflecting the tension
between the one and the many, and between the institutions that reflect the former and the institutions that reflect the latter. Even in the
United States, the cold war is still being fought (although tempered
significantly by the hot Civil War) but is played out more between
other institutional actors and in the "political" arena. Perhaps the
main advantage of this proposal is that it places some of the human
protagonists in a single room and requires of them reasoned and
generalizable (legal) discourse. It removes the decision from the linguistic realm of inter-judicial politics, in which a national court might
say "we know this will destroy the Community, but it is our mandate,"
to the linguistic realm of inter-judicial law, in which the decision requires Community-level justification. A second advantage is in the
ability of the national members of this constitutional council to speak
to the council of their own national eros, and by doing so, and being
heard to do so, to legitimate its restraint. This institution thus would
replicate and hopefully would reflect at the Community institutional
level the national eros. Its potential advantage is in accommodating
and coopting national constitutional fidelity, making it an integral
component of the Community legal order. For Community constitutionalization can never be complete in the sense of erasing the national, but can only proceed by adding institutional layers that reflect
actual vertical relationships and complexity.
CONCLUSION

There is, really, no conclusion. Classical European constitutionalism has had the exquisite fate of being a concept and reality which
moved from being ahead of its time to being behind the times with no
interregnum. For those who wish to borrow - caveat emptor! However, borrowing has been made more attractive by the fact that European constitutionalism now appears less unique. Designers of
institutions -whether negotiators of treaties, ambassadors, legislators
or adjudicators - no longer are required to choose between only municipal law and international law, with perhaps a furtive covetous
glance at that sui generis European construct. It is time to view European constitutionalism as a model that may be copied, if and to the
extent that its structure seems useful in other contexts. The constitu-
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tionalism of Arthur Dunckel is not necessarily of a lesser order than
the constitutionalism of Jean Monnet, or, dare we say it, James
Madison.
The reformation of constitutionalism described here reflects the
reformation also of the international law perspective and of international,law itself. International law is not separate from municipal law.
Rather, international law and municipal law are to be seen as mutually interdependent and mutually interpenetrating. Each has different
applicability in different contexts. European constitutionalism is international law, and it is domestic law. Law is law. The world is one
and each of us lives in a single legal system. But this world is complex,
comprised of multiple overlapping teloi and legitimated by multiple
overlapping demoi. The only viable theoretical perspective is monism, but dualism remains with us as a matter of policy technique. Law
is law, and international law may penetrate the state, but whether it
should or not is a technical decision based on the desired outcome.
On this reading Van Gend en Loos did not mark the creation of a
new legal order, but the commencement of a mutation of the old international legal order. It is time to view European constitutionalism
as a mutation of international law that has survived and, dare we say,
flourished. The real world has evolved and it is time to adjust, or reform, our perception to accommodate this evolution.
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